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HIDING THE STATUTE IN PLAIN VIEW:
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN
MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR
Michael J. Zimmer*
The Supreme Court decided in University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar1 that the “motivating factor” level of proof to establish liabil-
ity set forth in § 703(m)2 and the “same-decision defense” to full remedies of
§ 706(g)(2)(B) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 do not apply to
claims of retaliation brought pursuant to § 704(a).4 Instead, Title VII retaliation
must be the “but-for” cause of the adverse action that a plaintiff challenges. The
obvious impact of Nassar is that it makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to
prove retaliation. In some ways, Nassar is a surprise because the Court had
consistently held for plaintiffs in a number of retaliation cases.5 In other ways,
it was not a surprise that the Court would move its retaliation jurisprudence
more in line with its recent pro-employer, anti-civil rights interpretation of stat-
utes typified by its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services.6 As will be
demonstrated, the Court reached its conclusion by hiding the terms and the
structure of Title VII in plain sight while replacing the actual terms of the
statute with terms of its own creation. Further, the majority of the Court was
captivated by a hypothetical presented by counsel for the employer—a fact
pattern that does not appear to have happened in any reported case—with that
captivation indicative of the majority’s perspective favoring employers over
employees in its recent antidiscrimination decisions.
Dr. Naiel Nassar is a physician of Middle Eastern descent who is an expert
in infectious diseases and a specialist in HIV/AIDS treatment. From 1995 to
1998 and again from 2001 to 2006, he was on the faculty of the University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center, as well as a member of the medical staff
of the hospital. He served as Associate Medical Director of the hospital’s Ame-
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. With Professors Sandra
Sperino and Deborah Widiss, I worked on an amicus brief on behalf of Employment Law
Professors in Nassar. My thanks to them, to Bill Corbett, Barry Sullivan, and Charlie
Sullivan for their valuable insights, Loyola library’s Joe Mitzenmacher for his invaluable
research help and, as always, special thanks to Margaret L. Moses.
1 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
3 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
4 Id. § 2000e-3(a).
5 See Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60
S.C. L. REV. 917, 917 (2009). See also Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Anti-Retalia-
tion Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010) (the Court’s pro-plaintiff retalia-
tion decisions on statutory claims are based on a law enforcement model).
6 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (all ADEA age discrimination
claims must be proved to the “but-for” level of proof).
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lia Court Clinic, working under the supervision of its Medical Director, Dr.
Phillip Keiser.7
In 2004, the medical school hired Dr. Beth Levine to supervise the Clinic
and Dr. Nassar. From the start, Dr. Levine treated Dr. Nassar differently from
the rest of the medical staff in unfavorable ways. On a number of occasions,
Dr. Nassar met with Dr. Gregory Fitz, the medical school’s Chair of Internal
Medicine and Levine’s supervisor, to complain about Levine’s unwarranted
and unusual scrutiny. Trying to escape her racist statements and discriminatory
treatment while still working for the clinic, Dr. Nassar tried to arrange becom-
ing an employee of the hospital instead of just being on its medical staff. Hav-
ing been told by the hospital that he would be hired if he resigned from the
medical school faculty, Dr. Nassar sent a resignation letter to Dr. Fitz in which
he cited the discrimination by Dr. Levine as the reason he was leaving. Dr.
Nassar then negotiated his employment contract with the hospital. After receiv-
ing Dr. Nassar’s resignation, Dr. Fitz moved to block Dr. Nassar’s appointment
at the hospital because he thought that Dr. Levine had been publically humili-
ated and needed to be publically exonerated.8
Dr. Nassar filed charges with the EEOC and brought suit against the medi-
cal school, claiming that he suffered from discrimination (because of his
national origin) and retaliation by Dr. Fitz, who stopped his appointment by the
hospital. At the liability stage of the trial, the district court instructed the jury
that Dr. Nassar had the burden to prove that his protected characteristics and
protected activities were motivating factors for the medical school’s conduct,
even though other factors might also have motivated it. The jury returned a
verdict for Dr. Nassar, finding that his resignation from the medical school
faculty was the result of a racially-motivated constructive discharge and that
the medical school blocked the hospital from hiring him in retaliation for his
complaints of discrimination.9
At the remedy stage, the court instructed the jury on the affirmative same-
decision defense: If the medical school could prove that it would have stopped
the hospital from hiring Dr. Nassar even absent a retaliatory motive, then the
medical school would not be liable for damages or backpay. Attempting to
make such a showing, the medical school argued to the jury that Dr. Fitz made
his decision to block the hospital from hiring Dr. Nassar in April 2006, well
before Dr. Nassar sent his resignation letter. The medical school offered, as an
affirmative defense, a 1979 agreement between the school and the hospital
where the hospital would only hire doctors who were on the medical school
faculty. The jury rejected the medical school’s affirmative defense and found
that it had failed to prove that it would have blocked Dr. Nassar’s hiring at the
hospital even if it had not considered Dr. Nassar’s national origin and race. Dr.
Nassar was, therefore, entitled to full remedies for the discrimination and retali-
ation he had suffered.10
The medical school appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed the finding of
discrimination, deciding that the discrimination Dr. Nassar suffered did not
7 Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012).
8 Id. at 450–51.
9 Id. at 452.
10 Id. at 451–54.
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constitute constructive discharge.11 But the court upheld the finding that the
medical school had unlawfully retaliated against him “to punish [him] for his
complaints about [Dr.] Levine.”12 While four judges dissented, the Fifth Circuit
decided not to rehear the case en banc.13 The medical school petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted. The Court vacated the lower
court’s judgment.14
I. THE STRAIGHTFORWARD INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII
Imagine looking at the text of Title VII for the first time.15 That is what
the plain textual meaning approach of statutory interpretation suggests to make
sure that it is the text of the statute that is being interpreted. The Supreme Court
has recently used the plain meaning approach in several antidiscrimination
cases.16
Sections 703 and 704 set out the substantive provisions of Title VII. Sec-
tion 703 is entitled “Discrimination Because of Race, Color, Religion, Sex, or
National Origin” and § 704’s title is “Other Unlawful Employment Prac-
tices.”17 Putting the two together suggests that, since § 704 prohibits unlawful
employment practices, so too should the discrimination addressed in § 703 be
characterized as unlawful employment practices. A standard principle of statu-
tory interpretation requires that identical phrases appearing in the same statute,
Title VII in this case, ordinarily mean the same thing each time they are used.18
Because the substantive provisions of Title VII focus on “unlawful employment
practices” committed by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations
and training programs, the underlying organizing principle of the statute is to
focus on the behavior of potential defendants and not on the nature of the
claims of plaintiffs.19 In other words, Title VII creates causes of action against
11 Id. at 452, 456.
12 Id. at 454.
13 Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2012).
14 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
15 We may all be prone to look past the terms of a statute, like Title VII, that has been on the
books for a long time and subject to much litigation. There may be some tendency to read
the judicial gloss as the statute. Antidiscrimination decisions tend to discuss whether the
plaintiff has proved discrimination and focus less on the structure and text of the statute that
turn on the conduct of the defendant.
16 In interpreting Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–33a, the Court has emphasized the importance of focusing on the statutory text. See
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (interpreting § 703(m) of Title VII); Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (interpreting § 623 of the ADEA). In Vance v.
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013), decided the same day as Nassar, the Court
said it was applying a plain meaning approach to determining who was a “supervisor” for
purposes of an employer’s vicarious liability for harassment. Justice Antonin Scalia and
Bryan Garner call this the “Ordinary-Meaning Canon”: “Words are to be understood in their
ordinary, everyday meanings . . . .” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (2012).
18 See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007).
19 The term “unlawful employment practice” is not defined in the definitions in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2012), but instead its definition is determined by all the substantive provisions of
§ 703 and § 704.
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perpetrators of discrimination, so the law is structured around those violations
and those violators, even though its goal is to protect victims of discrimina-
tion.20 Eight different subsections of § 703 and § 704 set forth all of the unlaw-
ful employment practices prohibited by Title VII. The most commonly referred
to provision, § 703(a), sets forth a long list of unlawful employment practices
committed by employers:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.21
Section 703(b) then describes unlawful employment practices of employ-
ment agencies,22 § 703(c) sets forth unlawful employment practices of
unions,23 and § 703(d) does the same for training programs.24
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended § 703 to add two additional
employment practices that an employee may challenge can be challenged as
discrimination. Section 703(k) makes the use of an employment practice that
20 The purpose of Title VII is to end discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin and so it is easy to see issues from the perspective of potential victims of
discrimination. The structure of the statute, however, focuses on the potential liability of
perpetrators of discrimination.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
22 Section 703(b) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer
for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(b).
23 Section 703(c) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization—
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individ-
ual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of
this section.
Id. § 2000e-2(c).
24 Section 703(d) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-
the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to pro-
vide apprenticeship or other training.
Id. § 2000e-2(d).
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causes unjustified disparate impact an unlawful employment practice25 and
§ 703(l) makes it an unlawful employment practice to change employment test
scores “on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”26 Unlike
the substantive provisions originally enacted in § 703, these two new subsec-
tions do not delineate who the potential violators are. Presumably, they would
be unlawful employment practices if utilized to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin by employers, employment agencies,
labor organizations, or training programs.
Section 704, which is part of the Act as originally adopted, adds two more
unlawful employment practices.27 The unlawful employment practice at issue
in Nassar is retaliation prohibited by § 704(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any indi-
vidual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.28
The legislative history of § 704 is sparse and gives no indication of why
the two employment practices made unlawful by it—retaliation and publishing
discriminatory job notices—were put in a section separate from those made
unlawful by § 703.29 Originally, the subsections of § 703 delineated what type
25 Id. § 2000e-2(k).
26 Id. § 2000e-(l).
27 Section 704(b) makes it an unlawful employment practice for a broad group of potential
defendants to publish discriminatory job notices. Section 704(b) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or
published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an employer or member-
ship in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating
to any classification or referral for employment by such an employment agency, or relating to
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training by such a joint labor-management committee, indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, except that
such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimina-
tion based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification for employment.
Id. § 2000e-3(b).
28 Id. §2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). Nassar’s claim of retaliation was based on the opposi-
tion clause.
29 Congress regularly puts antiretaliation provisions in separate sections from the substan-
tive sections of labor and employment law. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 215 (2012); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2012). As for the legisla-
tive history, see Interpretative Memorandum on Title VII, reprinted in U.S. EEQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 3039, 3040 (1968), which states only that § 705(a) “prohibits discrimination
by an employer or labor organization against persons for opposing discriminatory practices,
and for bringing charges before the commission or otherwise participating in proceedings
under the title.” See also Edward C. Walterscheid, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition
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of organization could violate the Act while the two subsections of § 704
applied to all potential defendants—employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations and training programs. Without more, it is speculative to con-
clude that it is this distinction between subsections that are focused on single
classifications of potential defendants and those that target all four classifica-
tions that caused Congress to enact the two separate sections creating substan-
tive violations. The Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (that
added to § 703 the disparate impact and test score provisions that are not linked
to any particular class of potential defendants) would not likely have intended
to differentiate between § 703 and § 704 on that ground.30 It is the present text
that is the basis for interpreting the statute.
Adding up all of the different unlawful employment practices that employ-
ers, employment agencies, unions, or training programs could commit that vio-
late Title VII totals twenty-four.31 Four subsections focus on the class of the
potential defendants and four do not. Section 703(k) is not linked to any partic-
ular type of actor but prohibits a “respondent” from using an unjustified
employment practice because of its disparate impact.32 Section 703(l) is also
not linked to any particular actor but it prohibits a “respondent” from changing
test scores.33 Section 704(a) prohibits retaliation but applies to all the potential
classifications of defendants covered by Title VII as does § 704(b) as to pub-
lishing discriminatory notices or advertisements.34
Two of § 703’s subsections establish ways to prove that an employment
practice is unlawful, both of which were added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Section 703(k) establishes how to prove disparate impact discrimination, a the-
Conduct as Protected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L.
REV. 391, 393 (1988) (stating that there is an “almost total absence of any legislative his-
tory” on § 704(a) and that committee reports “simply repeat certain language of Section
704(a) without any explanation of its meaning”) (citation omitted).
30 For an inside-the-Administration view of the actual legislative background of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, see Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994) (this “legislative history” is an insider’s
view describing the process rather than the traditional notion of legislative history based on
the proceedings in Congress). A more traditional and comprehensive legislative history is
published in a seven volume set. See 1–7 BERNARD D. REAMS JR. & FAYE COUTURE, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 102-166 (1994).
31 Here is how the total gets to be twenty-four. Employer unlawful employment practices
involve 1. hiring, 2. discharging, 3. compensating, 4. terms, 5. privileges of employment, 6.
limiting, 7. segregating, 8. classifying to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties, and 9. adversely affecting status. Employment agency unlawful practices include 10.
failing or refusing to refer, 11. otherwise discriminating, or 12. classifying or referring on
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Labor organization unlawful practices
involve 13. failing or refusing to refer, 14. otherwise to discriminate, 15. classifying to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, and 16. causing an employer to dis-
criminate. Training program unlawful employment practices include 17. failing or refusing
to refer, 18. otherwise to discriminate, 19. classifying or referring on basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Section 703(k), added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
prohibits 20. unjustified disparate impact. Section 703(l) involves 21. changing test scores.
Section 704(a) involves 22. opposing, 23. making a charge, and 24. Section 704(b) involves
publishing discriminatory notices.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
33 Id. § 2000e-1(l).
34 Id. § 2000e-3.
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ory that does not include any state of mind element of the defendant to establish
that an employment practice is unlawful.35 For claims of intentional discrimi-
nation, § 703(m) sets forth the level of proof necessary to connect the alleged
adverse action to the defendant’s intent to discriminate: “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”36
Shaped around the common prohibition of unlawful employment prac-
tices, all of these substantive violations—whether limited to certain kinds of
actors, such as employers or unions, or more broadly applied—are part of one
whole. Some employment practices that discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin are made unlawful when committed by a spe-
cific type of actor—employer, employment agency, union or training pro-
gram—and others, in both § 703 and § 704, are unlawful if committed by any
actor that can engage in an unlawful employment practice. Certainly, after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the distinction between employment
practices made unlawful by § 703 or by § 704 is a distinction without any real
difference.
Given that § 703(m) applies to prove any “unlawful employment practice”
and since § 704(a) characterizes retaliation as an “unlawful employment prac-
tice,” the answer to the issue in Nassar—whether the “motivating factor” stan-
dard of proof of § 703(m) applies in § 704(a) retaliation claims—is simple. The
answer is yes. During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg made this very straight-
forward interpretation of the relationship between § 703(m) and its application
to § 704(a) in this colloquy with counsel for the medical school:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: If we look at this [703](m) section, it says, “except as other-
wise provided in this subchapter.” I take it that would include retaliation as well, in
the subchapter.
MR. JOSEFFER: Yes.
JUSTICE GINSBURG: “An unlawful employment practice is established.” And
then, when we go over to the retaliation provision, it says, “It shall be an unlawful
employment practice.”
So why doesn’t that suggest that the — “an employment practice” under the retalia-
tion provision is the same as “an employment practice” under this —37
At this point, counsel for the medical school interrupted, but did not pro-
vide an answer. Instead, he reiterated the basic claim that the substantive provi-
sions of § 703 focus on the five prohibited characteristics—race, color,
35 Of course, nothing prevents a claim of disparate impact discrimination from being the
basis for a finding of intentional discrimination if there is evidence that would support draw-
ing the inference that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m).
36 Id.
37 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517 (2013) (No. 12-484), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argu
ment_transcripts/12-484_c9dh.pdf.
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religion, sex, and national origin—while § 704 does not.38 While § 704(a) does
not include the terms “race, color, religion, sex and national origin,” it obvi-
ously refers to these characteristics because employment actions based on these
characteristics are those that are “made an unlawful employment practice” by
Title VII. Thus, § 704(a) is closely linked to the rest of Title VII’s substantive
provisions.
Later in the argument, a majority of the court declined to use a plain
meaning approach. Justice Sotomayor answered Justice Ginsburg’s earlier
question, stating that Title VII “[c]alls [discrimination and retaliation] identical
things, an unlawful employment practice.”39 Then, in answer to Justice Scalia’s
call to look at the text of the statute rather than the intent of different Con-
gresses, the Assistant Solicitor General elucidated the plain meaning
interpretation:
I am actually happy to turn to the text. I think it’s important to look at the language of
Subsection [703](m). . . . And, if you follow that language, it starts off very plainly
saying as, “Except as otherwise provided in Subchapter (m), unlawful employment
practice is established.” This is a means of proving an unlawful employment practice.
And we know, when you look at [704] (a) . . . that retaliation is an unlawful employ-
ment practice. Congress used that phrase “unlawful employment practice” in Subsec-
tion (m). It’s an unadorned phrase. It didn’t limit it. It didn’t say “under this section.”
It didn’t say “under Section [704](a).” It said “an unlawful employment practice.”
And if you continue on, “when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor.” And we know, under this
Court’s cases under Gomez-Perez, under CBOCS, under Jackson and Sullivan, that
race is a motivating factor in an employment decision that is based on retaliation
when you’ve complained about race discrimination. And so the language of
[703](m), the plain language, clearly encompasses the retaliation claims in Title
VII.40
Justice Kennedy responded, claiming the plain text meaning would read
some words out of § 704(a): “Well, but under — under that analysis, you don’t
38 Well, the — under Title VII, there are basically three different ways to establish an unlawful
employment practice. One is the general provision for discrimination because of membership in
a class. One is because of retaliation. And this is another one.
So this defines, basically, a third way of establishing whether an employment practice is unlaw-
ful. And what it says is that any employment practice that is motivated by one of the five listed
factors is an unlawful employment practice. So this is why it all keeps coming back to do those
five factors, those five motivations, do they or do they not include retaliation?
Id. at 13–14.
39 Id. at 22. Later in the argument, counsel for the plaintiff, made the same point:
[§2000e]-2(m), on its text, applies to e-3(a). Congress could have very well put an e-2(m) under
this section. It could have very well put an e-2(m), an individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, but what it did was it said a complaining party must demonstrate — and then it
lists those things. And then it says, “for any employment practice.”
E-3(a) specifically defines retaliation as an unlawful employment practice. So the text of e-2(m),
which, again, was a new provision altogether — Congress did not go in and amend e-2(a)
through e-2(d), as it easily could have done, but it created a new provision.
Id. at 29.
40 Id. at 51–52. The four opinions referred to are: Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474
(2008); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969).
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need the final clause . . . ‘because he has opposed.’ Race is enough.”41 To this,
the Assistant Solicitor General replied that the conduct § 704(a) prohibits is
opposition as described in the clause Justice Kennedy referred to:
I think that [clause] defines what the protected activity is. I don’t think it is any
different than in Jackson or Gomez-Perez. In those cases, it was a general discrimi-
nation provision, but, once retaliation claims are recognized, there — there still actu-
ally needs to be protected activity. There has to be opposition. There has to be
participation of some sort. And so I don’t think it’s any different in that respect.42
Finally, in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg made the plain meaning interpre-
tation clearly and forcefully based on the Civil Rights Act of 1991:
There is scant reason to think that, despite Congress’ aim to “restore and strengthen
. . . laws that ban discrimination in employment,” House Report Part II, at 2, Con-
gress meant to exclude retaliation claims from the newly enacted “motivating factor”
provision. Section [703](m) provides that an “unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished” when the plaintiff shows that a protected characteristic was a factor driving
“any employment practice.” Title VII, in § [704](a), explicitly denominates retalia-
tion, like status-based discrimination, an “unlawful employment practice.” Because
“any employment practice” necessarily encompasses practices prohibited under
§ [704](a), § [703](m), by its plain terms, covers retaliation.43
Despite being presented with the argument that a plain meaning approach
would rather easily answer the question presented, a majority of the Court
looked elsewhere. If it had applied the plain meaning canon, the lower court’s
decision would be affirmed and the “a motivating factor” standard applied in all
Title VII retaliation cases.44
II. THE SUPREME COURT MISSES THE OBVIOUS
Instead of a straightforward interpretation of the text that was consistent
with the structure of Title VII, the Court sliced and diced the terms of the
statute to reach a result that is at odds with the plain meaning of both the terms
and the structure of the statute.45 Writing for the Court in this five to four
decision, Justice Kennedy began by dividing all of the employment practices
made unlawful by Title VII into two separate types of violation—“status-based
discrimination” and “retaliation”46—neither of which are terms included in
Title VII.47 For Justice Kennedy, status-based discrimination is discrimination
that violates § 703(a)(1): “prohibitions against employer discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in hiring, firing, salary
41 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 52–53.
42 Id. at 53.
43 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2539 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
44 It would presumably be of some legal authority to support reaching similar results in
other antidiscrimination statutes that provide a basis for challenging retaliation.
45 Ironically, the Court claims that its interpretation honors Congress’ “structural choices”
when that is precisely what it does not do. Nassar, 133 S. Ct at 2529.
46 Id. at 2522.
47 The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not appear to address whether
or not new § 703(m) applies to § 704(a) retaliation claims, it is replete with statements
including retaliation with other forms of discrimination. See generally REAMS & COUTURE,
supra note 30.
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structure, promotion and the like.”48 Section 703(m)’s “motivating factor” test
applies to claims based on five different characteristics—race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin—that are prohibited bases for establishing liability. Jus-
tice Kennedy further asserted that “[t]he second type of conduct is employer
retaliation on account of an employee’s having opposed, complained of, or
sought remedies for, unlawful workplace discrimination,” and, based on
§ 704(a): “[t]he two remaining categories of wrongful employer conduct—the
employee’s opposition to employment discrimination, and the employee’s sub-
mission of or support for a complaint that alleges employment discrimination—
are not wrongs based on personal traits but rather types of protected employee
conduct.”49 While this is true, the statute makes no distinction between per-
sonal traits and protected employee conduct. Furthermore, like §§ 703(a) to (d),
§ 704(a) does explicitly make it an unlawful practice “to discriminate against
any individual,” language that channels the language of § 703.50
Having created out of whole cloth the distinction between status claims of
discrimination and retaliation claims in the opening paragraphs of the opinion,
Justice Kennedy then set forth a statement of the case. When he returned to
analyze the law, Justice Kennedy appeared to treat the distinction he created in
the first part of the opinion as well established. He linked the “motivating fac-
tor” level of proof to what he characterized as § 703(a)(1)’s “status claims”
while refusing to apply that standard to claims where the employment practice
that is made unlawful pursuant to § 704(a) is retaliation. Evoking tort law,
which he claims is the default rule to establish “[t]he requisite relation between
prohibited conduct and compensable injury,”51 Justice Kennedy describes the
issue as one of causation in fact, “proof that the defendant’s conduct did in fact
cause the plaintiff’s injury.”52 If that truly were the question, Dr. Nassar would
win because the medical school did rescind the offer to him. But instead, Jus-
tice Kennedy conflated physical cause-in-fact—“was it the defendant that
injured the plaintiff?”—while the real issue was linking the defendant’s dis-
48 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522. Justice Kennedy’s dichotomy is underinclusive. Citing only
§ 703(a)(1) and § 704(a) inexplicably leaves out the rest of the substantive provisions of
Title VII including §§ 703(a)(2), (b), (c), (d), (k) and (l) and § 704(b).
49 Id. at 2522, 2525.
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a–d), 2000e-3(a) (2012).
51 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522. This is a relatively new and quite contested proposition. See
Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1431–34
(2012); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label (Jan. 15, 2013) (on file with the Univ. of Cincin-
nati College of Law), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2200990. Nassar is an example of a decision where tort law is used rather casually, without
really demonstrating the complexity that modern tort law entails. For example, causation is
not an element of a prima facie case of intentional torts such as assault, battery, false impris-
onment or the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cause in fact is an element of the
tort of negligence but disparate treatment is intentional discrimination, not discrimination
based on negligence. If the Court wanted to seriously engage the similarities between tort
law and employment discrimination law, then it would undertake a thorough explication of
both bodies of law so it could recognize distinctions and deal with them as well as the
similarities that might appear to exist at a more general level of abstraction.
52 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. That “defendant’s conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff’s
injury” is, of course, established beyond peradventure. Plaintiff would be entitled to sum-
mary judgment if the only question was whether the defendant, as opposed to some other
actor, rescinded plaintiff’s job offer.
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criminatory state of mind to the adverse action of retaliating against the plain-
tiff.53 Justice Kennedy used his distinction between status discrimination and
retaliation to overcome the unambiguous text of § 703(m), which clearly
applies to proof of any unlawful employment practices where the defendant’s
motivation is at issue.
It must be acknowledged that because Title VII defines “unlawful employment prac-
tice” to include retaliation, the question presented by this case would be different if
[§ 703](m) extended its coverage to all unlawful employment practices. As actually
written, however, the text of the motivating factor provision, while it begins by refer-
ring to “unlawful employment practices,” then proceeds to address only five of the
seven prohibited discriminatory actions—actions based on the employee’s status, i.e.,
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.54
This sleight of hand reads “unlawful employment practices” out of
§ 703(m), even though that term is the core organizing language that pulls
together the twenty-four different types of unlawful employment practices that
constitute Title VII violations. While it might be convenient shorthand to char-
acterize all twenty-four unlawful employment practices to be “actions based on
the employee’s status,” this characterization is entirely inappropriate if rephras-
ing the actual statutory language in that way drops important language from the
statute and undermines the basic structure of the act that turns on employment
practices that thereby are made unlawful.55
By disassociating § 704(a) retaliation from some of the types of discrimi-
nation prohibited by § 703, the Court appears to be implying that Title VII
retaliation is not bounded by the “five . . . prohibited discriminatory actions—
actions based on the employee’s status, i.e., race, color, religion, sex, and
53 Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190–91
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting), articulated the difference between physical cause—did the
defendant do it?—from determining the motivations for the action that defendant unques-
tionably vis-a`-vis the plaintiff:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-for” causation. In that context,
reasonably objective scientific or commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept
of “but-for” causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is an
entirely different matter to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, not physical forces,
but the mind-related characterizations that constitute motive. Sometimes we speak of determin-
ing or discovering motives, but more often we ascribe motives, after an event, to an individual
in light of the individual’s thoughts and other circumstances present at the time of decision. In a
case where we characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of multiple motives,
say, both because the employee was old and because he wore loud clothing, to apply “but-for”
causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the
employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different. The answer to this hypothetical
inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does the
employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the employer will often be in a
stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.
All that a plaintiff can know for certain in such a context is that the forbidden motive did
play a role in the employer’s decision. And the fact that a jury has found that age did play a
role in the decision justifies the use of the word “because,” i.e., the employer dismissed the
employee because of his age (and other things).
54 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528. The “Presumption of Consistent Usage” canon provides that a
“word or phrase is presumed to breathe the same meaning throughout a text . . . .” See
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 170.
55 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 174.
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national origin.”56 It is as if the Court fears that, without a toughened proof
standard, a worker could challenge her employer’s retaliation for being a
Republican or a vegetarian.57 That is simply not the case. Title VII retaliation is
linked to proof that the defendant’s retaliation against the plaintiff resulted
from opposition to discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
A common scenario in discrimination and retaliation cases is one where an
employee believes that she was not promoted because of her sex, and chal-
lenges the failure to promote as sex discrimination. Thereafter, the employer
takes some adverse employment action against her, and the employee under-
stands these actions to be retaliatory in response to her sex discrimination
claim. Even if she is unable to prove that the failure to promote was discrimina-
tion, the employee can still win her retaliation claim if the factfinder believes
that, in fact, the employer did retaliate against her for opposing the initial deci-
sion as discrimination. Thus, claims of retaliation are bounded by the thrust of
Title VII and are a form of discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex
and national origin.
While claiming to rely on Gross for its “persuasive force,”58 the Court’s
adventure in statutory creationism undermines the Gross approach in three
ways.59 First, the Gross Court emphasized the use of plain meaning as the basis
for statutory interpretation, quoting Engine Manufacturers Association v. South
Coast Air Quality Management District60 for the proposition that, “[s]tatutory
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”61 Effectively reading “unlawful employment practice” as
if it were absent from Title VII—while in actuality it is the core structural
provision that ties the entire statute together—is simply not consistent with the
approach the Gross Court said should be used in interpreting antidiscrimination
statutes. Second, the Court in Gross found that Title VII was not relevant to
interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because they were dif-
ferent statutes.62 If Title VII is not relevant to interpreting the ADEA, then it
should follow that the ADEA is not relevant to, nor of “persuasive force” in
interpreting Title VII.63 Third, the Court in Nassar used Gross to claim that,
56 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2528.
57 This misunderstanding can be seen in the question of Justice Kennedy during oral argu-
ment where he suggests that the plain text meaning of the text would read some words out of
§ 704(a): “Well, but under — under that analysis, you don’t need the final clause, . .
‘because he has opposed.’ Race is enough.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at
52–53.
58 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527.
59 From the viewpoint of the outcomes of the two cases, both favor employers because both
make it harder for plaintiffs to prove age discrimination in Gross and retaliation in Nassar.
60 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004).
61 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 173 (“Because Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden
of persuasion, however, [Title VII] decisions do not control our construction of the
ADEA.”). While in the past, the Court tried to harmonize the different antidiscrimination
statutes to maximize the protection provided the victims of discrimination, Gross is a water-
shed. It requires that the different statutes be read independently of each other.
63 Gross made a significant shift away from longstanding interpretative practice of reading
to the extent possible antidiscrimination statutes harmoniously so that these laws would be
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because the retaliation provision is in § 704(a), a separate section from § 703
with its “a motivating factor” standard, nothing in § 703 is relevant to the inter-
pretation of a claim made pursuant to § 704(a).64 This slicing and dicing of the
statute is directly at odds with the principle of statutory interpretation requiring
that the interpretation starts with the whole statute and finishes with it to deter-
mine that all terms are used consistently.65 Justice Kennedy’s approach is so at
odds with the plain meaning canon that Justice Scalia, who has devoted consid-
erable energy to reinvigorate the plain meaning approach,66 and Justice
Thomas, who wrote two previous antidiscrimination decisions, Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa67 and Gross (that emphasized the priority of the plain meaning
canon), should have, as a matter of principle, joined the dissenters to change the
outcome in Nassar. Their joining the opinion of Justice Kennedy makes one
wonder about the depth of their commitment to the plain meaning approach to
interpreting statutory text or, alternatively, to question what about the Nassar
case compelled them to overlook principles they stated so strongly in earlier
cases.
To reach the desired result, the Court had to deal with the longstanding
proposition, supported by many decisions, that a statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion included a prohibition on retaliation as one form of discrimination—even
where the statute does not refer to retaliation in so many words.68 Justice Ken-
nedy claimed to distinguish those decisions by again splitting in two the provi-
sions of Title VII. He claimed that those cases dealt with substantive bars to
discrimination, while Nassar “establishes the causation standard for proving a
violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.”69 Why this distinction would make a
difference is not clear since the question in Nassar does deal with the unlawful
employment practice of retaliation, which is certainly substantive.70 More sig-
broadly protective. To achieve a similar narrowing of antidiscrimination law that it under-
took in Gross, the Court in Nassar had to abandon the technique it said applied in Gross. 
64 The plain meaning canon of statutory construction involves interpreting the meaning of
specific terms of a statute but it is necessary to do that in the context of the entire statute.
Slicing apart the statute to give different meanings to the same term is exactly at odds with
longstanding approaches to statutory interpretation. Scalia describes this as the “Whole-Text
Canon”: “The text must be construed as a whole.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 167.
65 Nassar is not the first time this technique of statutory misinterpretation has been used.
See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L.
REV. 577, 577 (2001). One wonders how much thinner the Court will slice a statute in order
to achieve its desired substantive outcome. Will the next case divide a statutory section into
its subsections to reach a decision that is consistent with the Court’s policy predilections?
66 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (1997).
67 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
68 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 443 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter,
553 U.S. 474, 476, 480–81 (2008); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167,
173–74 (2005); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1969).
69 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013).
70 In oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that there was a hierarchical difference
between the core anti-discrimination provisions in § 703 and a less significant violation by
retaliating that is an unlawful employment practice in § 704(a).
It seems to me that the protection against discrimination — race, color, religion, sex — that sets
forth the basic principle of — of fair and equal treatment. The anti-retaliation provision is more
functional. The way you protect against that discrimination is you make sure people don’t retali-
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nificantly, Justice Kennedy, having earlier read the term “unlawful employment
practice” out of Title VII, then brought it out of hiding in order to support the
Court’s distinction between broad statutes that incorporate retaliation within the
meaning of “discrimination” and Title VII’s “detailed statutory scheme.”71 Of
all the disingenuous aspects of Nassar, this is perhaps the worst. Undermining
the significance and usefulness of being protected from retaliation makes the
ate when they complain about it. Now, that seems, to me, to be an order of — of hierarchy
removed from the basic principle. So, perhaps, you would have a different standard of causation
when you deal with that.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 48–49.
This is very much at odds with precedent. As the Court recognized in its prior retalia-
tion cases such as Sullivan, Jackson, CBOCS West, and Go´mez-Pe´rez, protection against
retaliation is fundamentally important to make the substantive prohibitions enforceable.
During oral argument, Justice Alito tried to justify making proof of retaliation more
difficult than for other types of discrimination because it is too difficult for an employer to
keep the fact that an employee filed a discrimination claim out of its mind when acting
adversely to the employee for nondiscriminatory reasons.
It’s one thing to say — and it’s a good thing to say to employers, when you are making employ-
ment decisions, you take race out of your mind, take gender out of your mind, take national
origin out of your mind. It’s not something you can even think about.
But, when you are talking about retaliation, when you are talking about an employer who has
been, perhaps publicly, charged with discrimination and the employer knows that the charge is
not a good charge, it’s pretty — it’s very, very difficult to say to that employer and very difficult
for the employer to say, I’m going to take this completely out of my mind, I’m not even going to
think about the fact that I am — have been wrongfully charged with discrimination.
Isn’t that a real difference?
Id. at 50.
71 This statute enumerates specific unlawful employment practices. See §§2000e2(a)(1), (b),
(c)(1), (d) (status-based discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations,
and training programs, respectively); § 2000e-2(l) (status-based discrimination in employment-
related testing); § 2000e-3(a) (retaliation for opposing, or making or supporting a complaint
about, unlawful employment actions); § 2000e-(3)(b) (advertising a preference for applicants of
a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2530. During oral argument, Justice Scalia made the argument that the
same-decision defense to liability under the “a motivating factor” standard supports the
Court’s conclusion.
What I’m concerned about is the text of this statute, which simply destroys your argument that
there’s no difference between retaliation and race discrimination. Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) lim-
its remedies where a defendant acted — and this is a quote from the statute – “for any reason
other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or in viola-
tion of Section 2000e-3(a) of this title.” It — it separates out 2000e-3(a), retaliation, from the
other aspects of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin discrimination.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 37, at 37–38.
This becomes arguable but only after the Court distinguishes away both the significance
of the many decisions that found retaliation to be discrimination and the text of § 704(a) that
prohibits Title VII discrimination by opposing or challenging it.
There is considerable literature studying whether oral argument questioning predicts the
outcomes in Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds
Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at Oral Argument in the U.S.
Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 256 (2009) (“[T]he attention Justices give
to one side or the other at oral arguments significantly affects the outcome of a case.”). For a
critique of the Court’s use of information not in the record of the cases decided, see Arthur
Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ319.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-JUN-14 9:01
Summer 2014] HIDING THE STATUTE IN PLAIN VIEW 719
antidiscrimination statutes much less available to workers in an at-will world
where challenging the employer is extremely risky.72
III. WHY DID THE COURT DECIDE THE WAY IT DID?
So, why did the Court reject its recent interpretative approach to statutes
and reach well beyond the terms of Title VII to justify its decision? It is diffi-
cult to understand the Court’s failure to use the plain meaning method of statu-
tory interpretation when its use would lead to a simple answer to the question
presented—notwithstanding the Court’s protestations that its decision was con-
sistent with the plain meaning approach. Further, to reach its desired conclu-
sion, the Court had to undermine the approach it had recently taken in Gross by
ignoring some terms from Title VII, rather than reading the statute as a whole.
The Court’s answer is that all of this slicing and dicing of Title VII was
justified because of the “central importance to the fair and responsible alloca-
tion of resources in the judicial and litigation systems.”73 What the Court
deems to be a fair and responsible allocation of resources is a reduction in the
number and likelihood of success of retaliation actions because “claims of
retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency.”74 Justice Kennedy
asserts that using the “motivating factor” standard for proving retaliation would
open the flood gates of litigation to retaliation claims. Basing a decision to cut
back the scope of social legislation through misinterpretation of its terms is, by
itself, not an adequate justification unless the Court knows what the real rate of
retaliation is. If the amount of retaliatory conduct increases or the awareness of
it by its victims improves, the number of claims filed should increase. After all,
there is no indication that Congress did not, when it enacted Title VII, intend to
prohibit all retaliation that constitutes an unlawful employment practice. With-
out some empirical support for reconfiguring the legislation by the number of
claims filed, the Court is simply making an aesthetic or policy judgment, not an
interpretation based on the statute. That judgment is for Congress, not the
Court.75
Justice Kennedy also claimed that “lessening the causation standard could
also contribute to the filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources
from efforts by employer[s], administrative agencies, and courts to combat
workplace harassment.”76 Certainly some small percentage of all retaliation
claims, like any other kind of legal claim, may well prove to be frivolous.
72 For the development of the increasing insecurity of American workers, see Michael J.
Zimmer, Inequality, Individualized Risk, and Insecurity, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1 (2013).
73 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
74 Id. The number of these claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) has nearly doubled in the past fifteen years—from just over 16,000 in 1997 to
more than 31,000 in 2012. Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2013, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014). Counsel for the employer made this argument in oral argument.
Zimmer, supra note 72, at 29 n.133.
75 See Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court is No
Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161, 162–63 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court
is no longer acting as a court by deciding issues not litigated).
76 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531–32.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ319.txt unknown Seq: 16 12-JUN-14 9:01
720 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:705
However, interpreting the statute where Congress intended to encourage more
legitimate claims would likely only increase the number, but not necessarily the
percentage, of claims that would ultimately be found to be frivolous. In the
absence of any evidence about the actual rate of frivolous cases, the Court here
relied on a hypothetical situation posed by the medical school’s counsel in oral
argument:
Consider in this regard the case of an employee who knows that he or she is about to
be fired for poor performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just transferred to a
different assignment or location. To forestall that lawful action, he or she might be
tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious discrimination;
then, when the unrelated employment action comes, the employee could allege that it
is retaliation.77
During oral argument, Justice Kennedy appeared to focus on this
hypothetical:
I thought the thrust of Justice Alito’s question was that retaliation claims are — are
now quite common, and they can almost be used as a defensive — as a defense when
you know you are about to be [fired]. And, if that’s true, shouldn’t we be very careful
about the causation standard?78
There followed for four pages of the transcript a colloquy about the hypo-
thetical that involved the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Alito.79 What is
especially interesting about this hypothetical is that it appears to be precisely
that: a hypothetical. The Court’s opinion does not cite to any cases that
involved facts like the hypothetical, nor did the employer’s counsel in oral
argument. None of the briefs filed in the case cite to any cases either.80 That is
not a surprise since the hypothetical is based on a dubious assumption that
employees who would engage in this scheming have some rather sophisticated
knowledge of employment discrimination law.
While the hypothetical might reflect real incidents that have happened (in
unreported decisions) or incidents that conceivably could happen in the future,
77 Id. at 2532. Counsel raised this hypothetical in his oral argument. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 37, at 22–23. Justice Alito did the same. See id. at 30–31. Justice
Scalia opines that the employee would win the retaliation case if this hypothetical was a real
case. See id. at 32.
78 Id. at 45.
79 Id. at 45–48. Counsel for the medical school, Daryl L. Joseffer, of King & Spalding, is an
experienced Supreme Court litigator. Nassar is his twelfth oral argument before the Court
and he has filed more than one-hundred matters with the Court. Before joining King &
Spalding as the head of its national litigation practice, Joseffer had been Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, Assistant to the Solicitor General and counsel in the White House Office
of Management & Budget. Daryl L. Joseffer, KING & SPALDING, http://www.kslaw.com
/people/Daryl-Joseffer (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). There is a well-developed literature about
the significance of “repeat players,” lawyers who appear before the Court on numerous occa-
sions, as an influence on the decisions of the Court. See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat
Players in the Supreme Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J.
POL. 187 (1995).
80 Searching Westlaw to find any such cases is not easy. With the help of Reference Libra-
rian Joe Mitzenmacher, I used the following search which turned up twenty-four cases, none
of which appear to involve an employee using a claim of discrimination and retaliation as a
strategic defense to an expected adverse employment action: adv: employee +8 knew know!
suspect! § fire! terminat! “poor performance” (low! less! reduc! /4 pay salary) transfer! /p
charge! (bring brought file! /4 suit complaint action) sue! /s discriminat! /p retaliat!.
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the importance of the hypothetical’s attractiveness to a majority of the Court in
Nassar is that it demonstrates their basic inclination to see employment and
employment discrimination from the perspective of the employer, not the
employee, and not from an interpretation of the text and the structure of the
statute. The majority of the Court appeared to base its interpretation of the
statute on nothing more than the ability of the employer’s counsel to tell a story
that appealed to their preconceptions.81 The image of the worker gaming the
employer through the calculated misuse of the law brings to mind the powerful
stereotype that Ronald Reagan evoked of “welfare queens,” driving around in
“welfare Cadillacs.”82 The stereotype proved to be powerful politically, yet it
was not based on fact. Evoking the stereotype of conniving employees
appeared powerful enough to capture the support of a majority of the Court by
diverting their thinking away from the straightforward plain meaning analysis
of the statute, replacing it with the convoluted slicing and dicing of the statute
to reach a decision that was consistent with their policy predilections.83
IV. CONCLUSION
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg concluded that “the Court appears driven
by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against employers . . .
Congress had no such goal in mind when it added [§ 703](m) to Title VII.”84
Much like her dissent in the Lilly Ledbetter case,85 Justice Ginsburg used her
dissent in Nassar to call for Congress to step in and again amend Title VII to
overturn a Supreme Court decision that makes challenges to discrimination
more difficult86: “[t]oday’s misguided judgment, along with the judgment in
Vance v. Ball State Univ., should prompt yet another Civil Rights Restoration
Act.”87 Given the present composition of the Supreme Court, patching the
holes that it makes in antidiscrimination law may not suffice. Fraught with
81 Daniel Kahneman describes two ways that drive how our minds work: System 1 is “fast”
and intuitive responses to stimuli, and System 2 is “slow” and analytical but requires great
effort on the part of the observer. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13
(2011). The hypothetical used so effectively in Nassar appears to be the product of System
1’s fast thinking because it triggers stereotypes followed by System 2 slow thinking to
rationalize the initial intuition. For an essay relating the book to law and legal practice, see
Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some Reflec-
tions on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 1377 (2013).
82 See Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www
.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html (“Reagan repeatedly told the bogus story
of the Cadillac-driving welfare queen—a gross exaggeration of a minor case of welfare
fraud. He never mentioned the woman’s race, but he didn’t have to.”).
83 That may explain the failure of Justices Scalia and Thomas to challenge the convoluted
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